Participatory exclusion – Cyclone Sidr and its aftermath  by Nadiruzzaman, M. & Wrathall, D.
Geoforum 64 (2015) 196–204Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Geoforum
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /geoforumParticipatory exclusion – Cyclone Sidr and its aftermathhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2015.06.026
0016-7185/ 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
⇑ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: mn289@exeter.ac.uk (M. Nadiruzzaman).
1 http://www.medialit.org/reading-room/disaster-pornography-somalia#bio.M. Nadiruzzaman a,⇑, D. Wrathall b
aDepartment of Geography, University of Exeter, UK
bUnited Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), Germanya r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 6 February 2015
Received in revised form 19 June 2015
Accepted 28 June 2015
Available online 02 July 2015
Keywords:
Humanitarian assistance
Participation
Patron–client relationship
Marginality
Cyclone Sidra b s t r a c t
‘Nature does not discriminate, but humans do’ – this deliberately echoed sentiment in an area affected by
Cyclone Sidr problematizes the practice of resource distribution in post-disaster situations. While relief
and rehabilitation services have the objective of ‘building back better’, the possibility of elite-capture
of resource distribution channels, jeopardizes both humanitarian initiatives as well as future develop-
ment. This paper explores the political economy of post-Sidr interventions from an ethnographic account.
The paper establishes links between power networks and access to resources in the study area, ﬁnding
that marginality is a production of ongoing disaster interventions which favour the relatively well-off
over the structurally poor. Ultimately, humanitarian assistance channels resources through established
power networks, thus reinforcing them and producing uneven resilience among different social strata.
This paper offers important insights for redesigning the distribution of humanitarian assistance.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Post-disaster relief in various forms such as food and money is
designed to help those most in need. Relief recipients oscillate
between two extreme imaginaries – one portraying beneﬁciaries
as relief-dependent and helpless (as expressed in so called disaster
pornography1) and the other framing recipients as determined, opti-
mistic and resilient people who wish to return to prosperity with lit-
tle assistance from outside. Both of these extremes are of course
donor-centric. These imaginaries ﬁnd common ground in the ‘‘build
back better’’ mantra, now ubiquitous in Bangladesh and other
disaster-prone countries, which privileges communities as scale of
intervention and reiﬁes self-sufﬁciency as the end goal (Kennedy
et al., 2008). Resisting pro-donor Western imaginaries, this research
was designed to understand ‘‘community’’ and the effects of inter-
vention on development, through the ﬁrst-hand experiences of
affected people during the relief process.
In traditional cyclone management (GoB, 2007, 2008b,c,d), the
focus is on building and reinforcing infrastructure, cyclone shelters
and embankments; disseminating warnings; and distributing post
disaster relief and rehabilitation supports. This focus sharply dis-
tinguishes itself from ongoing development, viewing environmen-
tal risk through a separate lens to be managed. Despite povertybeing identiﬁed as one of the key triggers in causing disaster
(Blair, 2005; Chambers, 2006; Gaillard et al., 2010; Sen, 1981;
Wisner, 1993; Wisner et al., 2004), disaster management has been
erroneously separated from economic and social development
activities.
And yet the experience of disaster and the need for relief is
embedded in social, economic and political marginalization
(Watts and Bohle, 1993; Mustafa, 1998). Marginalization exacer-
bates risk, limiting people’s access to resources and livelihood
options; aggravating exposure and susceptibility to risks; reducing
people’s capacity to cope with adverse situations when they do
arise; and (as we argue) reducing the likelihood of beneﬁtting from
interventions. Gaillard et al. (2010) criticize the ‘paradigm of
extremes’, where technocrats from diverse disciplinary back-
grounds mainly emphasise narratives of hazard-induced destruc-
tion, while the ‘unnatural’ day-to-day pressures on people’s
livelihoods (O’Keefe et al., 1976; Wisner et al., 2004), which make
them more susceptible to any extreme event, remain
unacknowledged.
At the same time, marginality also constrains development, as
predicated upon livelihood opportunities. Everyday livelihood
pressures include access to resources, income earning opportuni-
ties, resource scarcity, unequal distribution, wider market pres-
sures, power struggles, and patron–client networks and
corruption (Scoones, 1998). Indeed these are barriers to develop-
ment, and of course, widening environmental variability ampliﬁes
the effect of these pressures on vulnerable people. Thus, the prac-
ticalities of people’s livelihoods in the face of environmental
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which development occurs (Adger and Brown, 2009).
Thus marginality inﬂuences risk and development ex ante, but
how does marginality operate in the post-disaster context?
Cyclones have a very visible effect on human life. But what we
see as the physical manifestation is not necessarily a reliable indi-
cator of the collective footprint of long-term social, economic,
political and natural processes. A swelling chorus of research calls
into question the effectiveness of relief interventions aimed at
community levels (Mercer, 2010; Cannon, 2014; Norris et al.,
2008). We argue here that poor outcomes result precisely due to
the potential for local elite capture of participatory approaches to
disaster response, and elites’ ability to materially privilege or
marginalize their constituencies. To test this hypothesis, the paper
explicitly considers the following questions. How is relief alloca-
tion determined and by whom? Where does control over relief
originate? How do the power groups operate, compete and negoti-
ate, locally, regionally and nationally within this process? Who is
eliminated from the loop? Answering these questions, this paper
aims to show (1) how power networks inﬂuence distribution of
resources; and (2) that a received or uncritical understanding of
community participation can lead to counter-productive post dis-
aster and humanitarian outcomes. This paper explores local polit-
ical dynamics and power relations that are linked to resource
distribution, revealing embedded social, economic and political
marginalization at the study site, which held people back from
recovering after Cyclone Sidr. In fact, politics and power relations
between individuals, groups and communities determine access
to resources, livelihood opportunities and shape the relationship
with the surrounding environment. The paper concludes that polit-
ical and power-laden interests reproduce the local social order and
after cyclones obtain inﬂuence over participatory approaches to
post-disaster relief (Arens and van Beurden, 1977; Bode, 2002;
Ellis, 2012).2. Participatory exclusion
The conceptual key to understanding how participatory
approaches can be employed as active tools of exclusion is
marginality. The term ‘marginality’ connotes something at the
edge, insigniﬁcant and inferior. The Macmillan English Dictionary
deﬁnes it as a transitive verb, ‘to marginalize’, to make someone
or something seem unimportant or irrelevant, or to prevent some-
one from having power or inﬂuence.2 The use of the term in vulner-
ability studies is a response to the environmental justice movement
of the 1970s, which locates environmental problems across the globe
in ethical terms. These include the apparent lack of entitlements
during the Bengal and the Sahel famines (Sen, 1981); failed market
mechanisms in the manifestation of droughts in Nigeria (Watts,
1983); and the political economy of soil erosion and land degrada-
tion in Nepal (Blaikie, 1985; Blaikie and Brookﬁeld, 1987). From its
initial uses, researchers have applied the term in the Bangladesh
context including, Arens and van Beurden (1977), Barkat (2000),
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) (1983), Bode
(2002), Blair (2005) and Hartmann and Boyce (1983), exploring
marginality through the lens of social justice in regard to shifting
poverty and access to resources. The fundamental insight on
marginality is that vulnerability arises from differential access to
resources and opportunities and an understanding that power medi-
ates this access (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Therefore, a group’s rela-
tive entitlement, enfranchisement and empowerment form the basis
for access to resources within their society and this interrelated tri-2 http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/marginalize (Accessed
on 27/11/2014).partite explains vulnerability. Consequently, societies disproportion-
ately impose a condition of ‘permanent emergency’ on the most
excluded members of society, which is merely revealed by natural
hazards (Mustafa, 1998; Watts and Bohle, 1993; Wisner, 1993).
Those at-risk become marginalized along at least four path-
ways: (1) geographically – they live in marginal, hazard-prone
areas; (2) socially – they are poor and discriminated against in
terms of class, ethnicity, age, kinship and networks; (3) economi-
cally – they lack access to resources; and (4) politically – their
voice is not heard and are excluded from political processes
(Gaillard et al., 2010; Robbins, 2012). Marginality can exist as a sin-
gle dimension or as a combination of dimensions, with forms of
marginality interacting to produce and exacerbate exposure to risk
and to accelerate vulnerability.
The countervailing effects of inclusion as an antidote to vulner-
ability are illustrated in many diverse contexts, such as the ignored
urban middle-class in ﬂood management in Bangladesh (Cook,
2010); differential impacts of the 1980s West African drought on
excluded sedentary farmers versus nomads (Wisner, 2009); politi-
cal exclusion of black South African women (McEwan, 2003);
exclusion of women from development planning, poverty and
resource struggles in the North Lampung (Elmhirst, 2001); the
exclusion and production of deprivation and death in 1995
Chicago heat wave (Klinenberg, 2002); and many others. All of
these ﬁndings echo marginality as exclusion from the power and
decision-making process that determines individuals’ or groups’
access to resources.
Sustainable livelihoods research has popularised the use of par-
ticipatory interaction with communities to address pressing prob-
lems. According to sustainable livelihoods approaches, cycles of
marginality can only be arrested by ensuring hands-on participa-
tion in decision-making processes (Mercer et al., 2008). Though
marginality and processes of marginalization must be distin-
guished from extreme poverty (Cook, 2010; Elmhirst, 2002;
McEwan, 2003), livelihood research identiﬁes a correlation
between levels of poverty and access to resources (Elmhirst,
2001; Howell, 2001; Wisner, 2009). The above theoretical discus-
sion suggests a two-way communication between the policy mak-
ers and the community to create an appropriate disaster policy,
which must advocate a participatory research approach to under-
stand the lives of poor, at-risk people. The government of
Bangladesh has recognised the need for participatory approaches
for sustainable development, and has already made gestures
towards this kind of approach in community risk assessments that
seek to ‘build back better’ (GoB, 2007, 2008a,b,d; Rector, 2008).
Theoretically, a participatory approach must be emancipatory by
defusing power relations and ensuring joint ownership between
the researcher/implementer and the community (Pelling, 2007);
however, as this paper demonstrates, participatory methods can
be captured by elite interests in post-disaster circumstances, and
used to actively marginalize community members. Thus, the anti-
dote becomes the poison.3. Power networks and relief distribution
Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State (1973–77), is
infamous among Bangladeshi people, and is often referred to, for
labelling Bangladesh as ‘a basket case’ for failing to use interna-
tional aid efﬁciently and transparently. Certainly, the quote has
to be contextualized in the geopolitical climate of the Cold War,
the US stance against Bangladesh over its 1971 liberation war
and its aftermath under the Mujib regime. However, Arens and
van Beurden (1977), in a rather powerful and nuanced way,
showed how poor rural marginal groups are trapped within tightly
knitted patron–client networks, which underpins similar
Fig. 1. Focus group discussion with SIDR victims. Source: Rector (2008:8).
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national aid at local level. This research has been echoed in
Hartmann and Boyce’s (1983) A Quiet Violence and BRAC’s (1983)
The Net. These ﬁndings have focused on power structures within
a rural setting and have inspired Bode (2002) and Lewis and
Hossain (2008a, 2008b), who later contributed to the idea of the
‘patron–client network’ by portraying the ﬂexibility and evolution
of the network in terms of its structural rigidity, extent, spatiality
and the philosophical stance of the researcher. Until the 1980s,
local power elitism was thought to be inherited, well-knitted and
historically conﬁned within a few families. However, later scholar-
ship revealed that traditional local leadership can be challenged by
newly emerged power networks, which evolve through their afﬁl-
iation with the wider institutional networks of partisan politics,
NGOs, businesses and so on.
This paper considers the power networks’ deliberate use of
exclusion and marginality in ordering resources in a post-disaster
context as its starting point. Taking into account these power net-
works, Fig. 1 raises questions about: (1) the type of power relation
between the NGO ‘researcher’ and the respondents; (2) the power
relations among the respondents where age and gender are clearly
very inﬂuential factors; (3) an appropriate environment where the
respondents are comfortable to interact; and (4) issues of research
ethics associated with this focus group. The basic argument of this
paper is that superﬁcial forms of inclusion (namely participatory
action research) can be actively employed to exclude speciﬁc peo-
ples from access to resources that become available in the after-
math of a cyclone and thus reinforce marginality. In fact, the
tools of participatory development have been expropriated by local
elites to create a sort of ‘participatory exclusion’.4 Upazila, is the most functional tier of the Bangladesh Local Government system, it
nsists of several Unions. The Union is often abbreviated as UP (Union Parishad), the
west tier of the Local Government structure in Bangladesh. A UP is divided into nine
reas called Wards. One or more villages form a Ward. Any resource from the4. The terror of Cyclone Sidr
On 15 November 2007, coastal Bangladesh was devastated by
Cyclone Sidr, a Category 4 storm, which swept across the western
coast and ripped through the heart of the country with 155 mph
(248 kph) winds which triggered up to 20 feet (6 m) tidal surges
(Paul, 2009). The number of deaths caused by Sidr is estimated at
3406 with 871 missing and over 55,000 people sustaining physical
injuries (GoB, 2008d). An estimated 1.87 million livestock and
poultry perished and crops on 2.4 million acres suffered partial
or complete damage. The storm also caused power outages that
resulted in a near-countrywide blackout lasting over 36 h
(Natural Hazards Centre, 2008).
The Joint Damage Loss and Needs Assessment Mission, led by
the World Bank, estimated the total cost of the damage caused
by Cyclone Sidr at US$1.7 billion, a ﬁgure that represents about
three per cent of the total gross national product of Bangladesh
(GoB, 2008d). More than two-thirds of the disaster damage was
physical and one-third was economic with most damage and losses
incurred in the private sector. Nearly two million people lost
income and employment in the most severely impacted districts.3
The effects of the cyclone were highly concentrated in the districts of
Bagerhat, Barguna, Patuakhali, and Pirojpur (see Fig. 2). All affected
coastal districts already recorded higher poverty rates than the
national average (GoB, 2008d).
The villages along the Boleshwar River have experienced huge
damage and loss, our ﬁeld site is one of those villages. The cyclone
affected every family in our ﬁeld site. Interviews with the survivors
and emergency relief agencies reveal that many of the survivors
had only the clothes that they were wearing, no food to eat and
no money to buy anything. Intruding salt water had contaminated3 Districts are the second largest administrative unit in Bangladesh, with an
average population of 2.5 million.drinking water ponds; crops and seeds, ﬁshing boats and nets were
either destroyed or washed away. Sidr had swept away all they
had.
On 9 July 2008, eight months after cyclone Sidr, the functional
administrative unit (called Upazila4) of our ﬁeld site published a
report on the accomplished and ongoing rehabilitation projects
within its jurisdiction. According to that report, around Taka
111 million (approximately £1 m) of cash had been distributed
among affected families. In addition, they had been provided with
emergency relief, such as dry foods, children’s food, water, water
puriﬁers, garments, blankets, tents and kitchen items. Parallel to this
emergency relief distribution, the Upazila also received seeds, power
tillers, irrigation pumps, livestock, sewing machines, trawlers and
nets to enable them to start engaging in different livelihood activi-
ties and restart their lives. Naturally, the amount of relief received
in no way matched the economic losses. In Bangladesh, any major
disaster relief comes from the government through the Prime
Minister’s relief fund, in addition to NGOs who also provide relief
money from individual philanthropists and international donors.
To bridge the gap between losses and resources, government agen-
cies and NGOs frequently run rehabilitation schemes, for example,
old-age and widows’ allowances, Vulnerable Group Development
(VGD), Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF), food for work, vulnerable
child funds, elderly education programmes and vocational training
schemes. However, it is important to explore the distribution mech-
anisms of these resources.
From post-Sidr ofﬁcial reports, we know the ﬁnancial sum of aid
relief spent under some categories and sub-categories. However,
we do not know whether relief was allocated according to need
or through kinships and afﬁliations within power networks. The
ethnographic strategy of inquiry in this paper was designed to
characterize the mechanisms of allocation for relief resources.5. Methods
Data presented here are based on the following ethnographic
methods, participatory observational data, daily interactions and
interviews with key informants. Data were gathered in three dif-overnment or outside can ﬂow to the local level only through the Upazila. It has a
uasi-administrative structure with a government bureaucrat as a chief executive
alled UNO), an elected Chairman and the local Member of Parliament (MP) as the
xecutive advisor of the Upazila council.co
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Fig. 2. Cyclone Sidr affected districts. Source: Nadiruzzaman and Paul (2013).
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1977); (2) learning through talking to people (Crang and Cook,
2007); and (3) archival research. There were some unfavourable
practicalities to tape recording interviews and focus group discus-
sions. Therefore, observations and informal discussions were the
main research tools. The researcher lived with the community for
a relatively long period of time, working as a school teacher.
Having been distinguished (as harmless) from other ‘outsiders’
such as NGO workers, government ofﬁcials, journalists and philan-
thropists, the researcher had an opportunity to understand the
local power dynamics, through participating in social and familial
events and to work as a mediator to draw a quotidian picture of
daily rhythms. This study is conducted in accordance with the eth-
ical principles set forth by the Graduate Committee of the
Geography Department, Durham University.
The research was designed to investigate the meaning and con-
text of disaster responses in every day lived experience. To under-
stand the thrust of any interventions with regard to disasterpreparedness, we engaged with fundamental questions: How was
the intervention designed and for whom?What were the consider-
ations in designing them? Who participated in the design process?
What was their political positionality? Who was excluded and
why? This analysis provided a multidimensional view for exploring
how respondents experienced these phenomena and gave insight
into how the phenomena are intricately connected together as a
whole system, or more appropriately, as an ecology.
5.1. Field sites
The data are based on eight months of ethnographic ﬁeldwork
in a southern coastal village in Bangladesh. The ﬁeldwork
(September 2009–April 2010) was conducted by the ﬁrst author,
after two consecutive cyclones in November 2007 (Cyclone Sidr)
and May 2009 (Cyclone Aila). The ﬁeld site village has been expe-
riencing frequent riverbank erosion, the river has pushed in
approximately half a mile in the last few decades leaving many
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amount of cultivable land. As a result, many people have become
wage labourers, illegal tree fellers in the nearby forest and ﬁsher-
men in the river or in the Bay of Bengal. This village was one of
the hardest hit by Cyclone Sidr in terms of death toll and destruc-
tion; several hundred people died and only four houses of brick
and cement were left standing. The village mosque was also a con-
crete structure but it was located by the river and Sidr left no trace
of its existence. Following Cyclone Sidr, several downstream vil-
lages along the Boleshwar River have received signiﬁcant media
attention and thus greater intervention by government and NGOs
for reconstruction. The affected community has a well-knitted kin-
ship network and local political power dynamics, which has facil-
itated access to development and rehabilitation resources.
6. Findings
This paper uses two cases to illustrate the power dynamics in
relief allocation and gives insight into participatory forms of alloca-
tion as a mechanism for exclusion. The ﬁrst case is that of Asiya, a
widow at the ﬁeld site, is living in a 10  15 square foot
single-room house with six children. Her eldest son is only four-
teen years old and is the main income earner for this
seven-person family. Asiya’s husband was severely injured when
cyclone Sidr struck and was hospitalised the following day. The
family could not afford to keep him in hospital for more than
two days and consequently he returned home and died a week
later. However, Asiya has not received any money from the emer-
gency relief fund meant to be distributed among the households
who lost family members in the cyclone. Nor have her children
received money from the Sidr orphan scheme.
Nevertheless, fund administrators ruled differently in the case
of Moushumi, a 12-year old granddaughter of an inﬂuential com-
munity ﬁgure, living a few doors away from Asiya. Moushumi
despite not meeting criteria of either fund became a beneﬁciary
of both. Moushumi’s grandfather defends her eligibility for those
two funds:
‘‘Moushmi’s father absconded after her mother’s death. I am
bearing all her costs. Besides, she is quite grown up now and I
need to arrange the costs for her wedding. And, you know,
Haulader Bari’s5 wedding needs to be a little lavish, which others
(within the village) would notice.’’
By contrast, Asiya explains her future plans as:
‘‘You see, I had to borrow a pira6 from my neighbour to offer you
to sit. My eldest son is only fourteen and he works as a labourer in
the forest and out at sea. If he falls sick, we will starve, so I am
sending my second eldest son with him, who is only twelve, to
increase our income and build some savings. If everything runs
smoothly over the next four years, I will buy a small boat and
some ﬁshing nets so that they can go ﬁshing in the river.’’
The two divergent stories of Asiya and Moushumi bring to the
forefront the question of objectivity, intention, ethics and gover-
nance of relief distribution. Their stories hint at how power, not
humanitarian impulses, plays a paramount role in the allocation
of relief distribution in Bangladesh.
The following paragraphs discuss the local power networks in
the ﬁeld site and their inﬂuence on relief distribution. Lack of
knowledge about local political power dynamics can marginalize5 Bari refers to a gusthi (Bode, 2002), a patrilineal kinship network, bears virtual
communal identity and informs local power dynamics. For example, Haulader Bari
(see Fig. 3) refers to a family kinship which dominates the power network at the ﬁeld
site.
6 A ﬂat wooden plinth offered to guests to sit on.the ultra-poor. Government and NGOs utilize rehabilitation funds
to try to address all levels of vulnerability, but strong patron–client
relationships, a paucity of accountability and inefﬁcient or insufﬁ-
cient monitoring systems create bottlenecks in ﬂows of relief
schemes. At local level, power is mediated through agency in a
decision-making environment with respect to activity, dispute res-
olution, resource allocation, or the practice of social norms, which
is typically expressed at the level of a collection of households, a
samaj (explained below). This power or agency can be expressed
informally through social networks and formally through institu-
tional afﬁliations.
6.1. Power through formal and informal agencies
Kinship is one of the fundamental building blocks in a wider
social order and is primarily expressed through the male family
line (ghusti is the local term, related to bari, see footnote). The
ghusti often has some physical expression in a residential neigh-
bourhood, called a para – where people from the same family tree
inhabit composite dwellings. Marriage within and between ghusti
or para often plays a major role in extending ghusti networks and
strengthening social capital (Bode, 2002). Thus, large farm house-
holds are likely to retain an elongated joint structure; in contrast,
poorer households are likely to have a segregated nuclear struc-
ture. The headman of a mid-scale farm household usually exercises
power within the household and its threshold – the neighbouring
households, which directly and/or indirectly depend on the big
farm household and obey its decisions – members together from
these extended households compose a samaj. Factions of interests
among several powerful individuals within a ghusti can clash, split
apart and different factions from previous rival ghusti may merge
together (Islam, 2002).
Disputes over control of resources can drive the samaj to break
up but these may be resolved through a shalish, a constitutionally
endorsed rural version of the judicial system, represented by a
panel to adjudicate over disputes: Shalish has both formal and
informal versions. Formally, shalish was ﬁrst accommodated at
the Union Parishad (UP) level judiciary system in 1961 by the
‘Shalish Court Ordinance’, which was then replaced by the
‘Village Court Ordinance’ in 1976. This law strives to reduce judi-
cial burdens of minor cases from the court through devolving legal
responsibilities to the lower tiers of local government (Chaodo,
2006). However, in practice, an informal norm of shalish is widely
accepted. Generally, in a dispute, both groups call upon a few local
elites to speak on their behalf. Such an advocate is called a salish-
dar. The salishdars sit together, argue in favour of their clients
and agree upon a ﬁnal decision, which the disputed groups abide
by. The wave of politicized local government institutions has
weakened the reputation of the shalish, though this Act legally
brought the elected body to prominence instead of simple inﬂu-
ence of wealth and power. These dynamics of informal local power
have a reciprocal relation with the formal local institutions like the
Ward, UP and Upazila.
The main reason for labelling formal and informal institutions
as reciprocal is embedded in the history of local leadership in rural
Bangladesh (Nadiruzzaman, 2008). Both institutions have mutually
shaped each other and leadership has changed mainly through
individuals’ command and control over particular resources, which
were the key drivers of the economy. For example, since the begin-
ning of cooperative cultivation in the late 1960s and the early
1970s, cooperative managers, model farmers and tractor drivers
started emerging as new leaders. Promotion of partisan political
activists of different political regimes at the local level of reformed
local government institutions, brought new faces to the forefront
and, where convenient, also engrossed existing ghusti leaders
(Bode, 2002; Nadiruzzaman, 2008), making local power dynamics
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from one hand to another, but rather how this shift of power is
only helping those within the power loop, at the expense of the
grassroots’ entitlements.
6.2. Role of development agencies in local power dynamics
It is not only the government or the political parties who
patronize the rural elites; NGOs often contribute to bias in the
political system. NGOs recruit local volunteers to help implement
projects, for instance in the selection of beneﬁciaries and informa-
tion dissemination and thus, they empower those volunteers with
information, new connections and access to resources. These vol-
unteers predominantly come from the afﬂuent section of the com-
munity. Figs. 3 and 4 show risk assessment and rehabilitation
meetings of two different NGOs. Interestingly, the dominating
faces and names in these pictures almost completely overlap with
Fig. 5, which is a ﬂow diagram explaining the local power dynam-
ics of the ﬁeld site. NGOs do not actively exclude volunteers from
marginal groups but poor people do not have much free time for
volunteering as their primary concern is to meet their basic needs,
for example, ensuring they have enough to eat. NGOs have limited
opportunity to work independently and the upper strata of the
beneﬁciary community consume a proportion of their service
deliveries. The previous case of Asiya and Moushumi is an example
of this. Besides, NGOs are strategically forced to compromise their
objectivity because of both informal political pressure and formal
obligations to the Upazila administration. Thus, the local political
dynamic is often reﬂected in NGO operations even though, strictly
speaking, relief operations are outside the administrative jurisdic-
tion of local authorities.
Government and NGOs do not address basic marginalization
processes in their disaster preparedness framework. For example,
the Boleshwar ﬁshing community is threatened by a particular
kind of ﬁshing net practice, which is the consequence of a vicious
local power structure. After the devastation of Cyclone Sidr, the
Boleshwar people received ﬁshing equipment either as aid or a
loan. But their continuing struggle for survival is symbolized by
the issues around the dhora jal, a local ﬁxed drift net. Despite being
in the majority, the vasha jal (ﬂoating ﬁshing net) users are fre-
quently disadvantaged when their gear gets caught up into the
dhora jal, which are illegal but supported by corrupt local ofﬁcials.
Therefore, marginalized ﬁshermen remain caught in a cycle of eco-
nomic vulnerability.
6.3. Role of external power network in development schemes
Like any typical rural political setting, our ﬁeld site’s power net-
work and development decisions are highly inﬂuenced by its afﬁl-
iate Upazila. Fig. 6 gives a brief picture of different power networks
on the basis of 2009 Upazila election. This is a complex blend of
partisan politics and kinship network. As we see in Fig. 6, four con-
tested for the 2009 Upazila Chairmanship, from major factions of
two main political parties, the Awami League (AL) and the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The research ﬁeld site, which
is a small fraction of Union (lowest administrative unit of local gov-
ernment in Bangladesh), was been divided into four groups in sup-
port of their cluster leads. However, the defeated contestant of the
then ruling party (AL) was the front runner in the ﬁeld site, which
left the winning Upazila Chairman (Kamal Akon in Fig. 6) with very
small mandates for that area. However, winning over Upazila
Chairmanship election gives Kamal Akon de jure control over gov-
ernmental schemes, which he shares with his political opposition
(BNP) at the ﬁeld site to wipe out his political faction (AL). Over
time, he negotiates with factions in his own party (AL) and
manoeuvre our political rivals. In such case, poor people outsidepartisan political network are often left out from rehabilitation
support (Nadiruzzaman and Paul, 2013).
Relatively wealthy locals are connected to partisan politics. The
party in power distributes contracts for local infrastructure devel-
opment and aid distribution, where they employ their allies in
‘Food and/or Cash for Work’ programmes and channel aid to their
own party constituents. These resources are invested to develop
partisan interests. For example, one politician of the present ruling
party (2014), who is also an elected representative of the Upazila
council, explained that he keeps 30 percent of aid relief for his
own party activists that surround him. He legitimized this state-
ment by arguing that as those people always work for him, they
deserve to receive something in return.
Political nepotism is to some extent accepted and overlooked
within the elite group. The ﬁrst author heard many stories of
events (which are corrupt in the strict legal sense) discussed loudly
in public. For example, a group of journalists were discussing the
Upazila Chairman’s son’s involvement in illegal timber felling
inside the Sundarbans and extortion from different governmental
relief schemes. Though we do not have, nor did we look for, any
hard evidence to prove whether the Upazila Chairman’s son was
guilty or not, it was interesting to note that the local journalists
do not intend to report his alleged acts as, to them, he was within
the limit of extortion expected from an Upazila Chairman’s son.
Meanwhile, opposition elites tend to ‘hold their breath’ for
future opportunities and avoid internal political strife. Some of
them take up factions within the ruling regime. As mentioned ear-
lier, in the Upazila council election in 2009, our ﬁeld site people
supported Mozammel who lost against Kamal of his own political
party. Therefore, after assuming ofﬁce, Kamal Chairman supported
rivals of Mozammel’s supporters, this rivalry continued until the
middle of 2011, when they agreed to cooperate with each other
and accordingly, Kamal Chairman extended his full-ﬂedged sup-
port to Mozammel’s election campaign for the afﬁliate Union
Chairmanship. This change of strategic partnership at the top
affects the previous patron–client relationships, manifested in
access patterns and the distribution of resources. Extremely poor
people, who are outside the loop fail to access to aid resources,
and look out for alternative livelihood options (Ellis, 2000).7. Discussion
‘‘Those who died in Sidr were blessed by God, as they escaped
from being in a living hell like us’’ – Anwara, an elderly lady shares
her grieves while explaining her post-Sidr experiences.
Anwarawas been to themeeting shown in Fig. 3, as shewas been
told that she will get a tokenmoney for attending that meeting. She
had no idea about the meeting agenda, and had no participation
either. Such effort ensures physical presence of people, not partici-
pation. Community participation has become a gimmick word in
governmental organizations and NGO interventions (Cannon,
2014). However, ‘community’ does not necessarily mean a group
of people from all strata of the community. Elite groups are able to
act and participate on behalf of the poor and inﬂuence development
activities to serve their own interests. The government has spon-
sored several rehabilitation schemes, like partial house repair, free-
dom ﬁghters’ beneﬁts, elderly allowances, widow assistance,
disability grants, VGD and so on, to strengthen the capacity of poor
communities. However, these schemes are fully controlled by local
elites, patronized by upper-ranked power elites. There are countless
examples of rampant looting in several forms, some of which are
mentioned in this paper. Local UP members and the Chairman are
responsible for making beneﬁciary lists under different schemes
and a substantial proportion of the listed beneﬁciaries of those
schemes are the elites and their close associates. After Aila, the
Si
dd
iq
ue
H
au
la
de
r
Sh
am
im
H
au
la
de
r, 
M
ok
bu
l m
em
be
r’
s 
yo
un
ge
st
 so
n,
 W
ar
d 
St
ud
en
t L
ea
gu
e 
Pr
es
id
en
t a
nd
 
vo
lu
nt
ee
rs
 o
f 
se
ve
ra
l N
G
O
s
Ja
ki
rH
au
la
de
r, 
M
ok
bu
l m
em
be
r’
s 
so
n 
an
d 
W
ar
d 
Ju
bo
 
Le
a g
ue
 p
re
si
de
nt
Se
ta
ra
A
ni
s, 
Fe
m
al
e 
U
P 
m
em
be
r
A
ns
ar
 C
om
m
an
de
r
K
ha
le
qu
e
K
ha
, 
M
oh
am
m
ed
 K
ha
’s
 
co
us
in
M
oh
am
m
ed
 K
ha
Fig. 4. Meeting on rehabilitation support by an International NGO. People who are present in this meeting, but out of focus on the moderator’s row, are Mokbul Member,
Mosharof Member, Sidam, Asgor and Khaleque Haulader. Source: Author’s own.
Mofazzal Kha, UP member 
Mosharof’s eldest brother 
and Sidam’s father
Rashid, Mokbul 
member’s cousin
Sohrab, Mofazzal’s 
brother in law
Anis Mallik, female UP member 
Setara Begum’s husband and Mokbul 
member’s brother-in-law
Ansar Commander, 
Village Defence 
Party (VDP) 
commander and 
Mokbul member’s 
stepbrother
Mohammed Kha, Mosharof 
Member’s uncle
Mokbul member, 
ex-UP member 
Sidam Kha, present UP 
member Moshartof’s eldest 
brother Mofazzal’s son. He 
is also Ward Student League 
Secretary and volunteer of 
several NGOs
Khaleque Haulader, Makbul Members 
eldest son and Chairman of the School 
Management Committee
Siddique Haulader, Ansar 
Commander’s brother-in-law
and school committee 
secretary
Rashid Haulader, Mokbul 
member’s nephew and 
Mofazzal’s father-in-law
Kanchon Haulader, 
Siddique’s brother
Facilitator from 
the NGO
Fig. 3. Community risk assessment meeting facilitated by a National NGO, before launching an intervention programme at the ﬁeld site. Source: Author’s own.
202 M. Nadiruzzaman, D. Wrathall / Geoforum 64 (2015) 196–204government distributed 3000 taka per household for repairing par-
tial damage of affected houses. In the middle of January 2010, the
government called for a list of 95 most-affected people at the ﬁeld
site: 42 cards were distributed through the inﬂuence of the
Upazila Chairman; 9 through a local Member; 4 by the female
Member; and remaining 40 by other local leaders of the Awami
League. This distribution did not serve government objectives, nor
did it address community vulnerabilities. Through this system, peo-
ple inherit vulnerability by virtue of their poverty and weak social
networks. In contrast to the ideals of emancipatory participation
(Pelling, 2007) ‘justice’ is a matter for the individual charity of the
administrator and is certainly not promised or delivered on the basis
of rights or a recipient’s vulnerability.
8. Conclusion
These ﬁndings show that apart from a very general exposure to
cyclones due to weak infrastructure, all other elements of materialloss and allocation of resources ﬁlter through unequal distribution,
extortion, nepotism, corruption, lawlessness and abuse of political
power, which are deeply embedded within the social, economic
and political system. These power networks can have material sig-
niﬁcance in the allocation of relief.
A cyclone generally comes every few years but exploitation pre-
vails at every step of life for ordinary people. As a result, they lose
more through ongoing struggles than through cyclones. A cyclone
impacts everyone indiscriminately, but not everyone can with-
stand and recover at the same time and at the same pace.
People’s marginality is mediated through their daily position
within the society and connections with the political and adminis-
trative elites. For some, marginality is a temporary circumstance.
For example, despite having wealth, some people may still be mar-
ginal, due to a political afﬁliation with the opposition. However,
even when in opposition, someone from the elite may still be in
a strategically advantageous position. For example, ruling parties
often create common causes with an ‘opposition ally’ in order to
Fig. 5. A model of kinship network at the ﬁeld site. Source: Author’s own.
Fig. 6. Wider power network at the ﬁeld site after the 2009 Upazila Council Elections (Coloured columns refer to different patron–client clusters. Top four are the cluster leads
and rest are not put in any order. There are cross cluster links as shown in Fig. 5). Source: Author’s own.
M. Nadiruzzaman, D. Wrathall / Geoforum 64 (2015) 196–204 203undermine a rival faction within their own political party. Thus,
marginality is a matter of one’s relative distance from the centre
of power. This is manifested in everyday livelihoods, in ﬁshing, in
struggles over land, in the right to use certain forest resources,
and so on.
In the end, it is not Cyclone Sidr but rather social and eco-
nomic marginalization through the misappropriation of resource
distribution, vested interests, or political and kinship networks,
which is pushing people into poverty and has taken the control
of their livelihoods away from them. There has been a growing
literature since the 1970s challenging naturalistic understandings
of disasters and this is underpinned by the search for embedded
economic and political inequalities and their role in triggering
catastrophes (O’Keefe et al., 1976; Sen, 1981; Watts, 1983). Thepoor are often regarded as the most vulnerable to a natural
event, with an assumed arithmetic relation between poverty
and disaster – with one prompting the other. Rather than
accepting this simplistic equation, it is useful to question
whether and how people have experienced this relationship
between poverty and vulnerability since Cyclone Sidr.
Accessing relief and rehabilitation packages, rebuilding homes
and exploring income-earning opportunities – all are connected
to the capacity of getting people back to normal life. An individ-
uals’ ability to command resources is linked to their social and
political identity, such as kinship, social networks, ﬁnancial
capacity and political connections and rivalry. Thus, resilience,
livelihoods, local power dynamics and cyclones are tied together
with a common thread.
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